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Analysis of the 2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes verifies claims that Australia is a
share-owning democracy. We show that higher income earners are most likely to own shares
and to own shares in a large number of companies, and that the 45–54 and 54–56 year age
groups are the peak for ownership. We also investigate ethical issues relating to share-
ownership by examining scenarios under which owners would sell their shares.
Ethical concern is highest on the issue of child labour. Yet there is surprisingly little concern
amongst shareowners over racial discrimination, which was less likely to lead to the sales of
shares than investment in genetically modified crops or foods, paying large bonuses to
executives or the production of military weapons. Women are more likely than men to adopt
an “ethical” stance on share ownership across all scenarios, although high income earners are
less likely to sell shares in the face of racial discrimination or the production of military
weapons by their companies.
Postmaterialists are just as likely as materialists to own shares, but much more likely to sell
them for ethical reasons, while those on the “left” of politics appear to be more ethical than
the “right”. Finally, owning shares in several companies reduces the likelihood of ethical
behaviour, with those owning shares in six or more companies least likely to sell for any
ethical reason.
Keywords: Share-owning, ethics, governance, child labour, racial discrimination
 
Introduction
 
ustralia is a democracy in which around
half the adult population directly own
shares in corporations and an even greater
number own shares through superannuation
funds. For managers of such corporations this
complicates an already difficult corporate
landscape; how should they handle the mix of
institutional and small shareholders? How
best to handle increasingly active shareholder
groups? To what extent does widespread
shareholding alter the political landscape
(hence corporate regulation)? To this mix we
add the focus of the current research: To what
extent do prominent social/ethical issues
influence shareholder intention to sell or retain
A
 
shares and what are the characteristics of such
shareholders?
This extends earlier research into share
ownership in Australia focused on the charac-
teristics of shareholders (White 
 
et al
 
., 2004) and
the political implications of shareownership
(Donoghue 
 
et al
 
., 2003). Our aim in this
research is to consider intentions to sell or
keep shares, while in future work we will
consider actual sales of ethically challenged
shares.
 
Method
 
We developed a series of questions relating to
share ownership that were included in the
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2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes
(AuSSA;  Gibson  
 
et al
 
.,  2004).
 
1
 
 The  AuSSA  is
a new cross-sectional national survey of Aus-
tralians aged 18 and over, the first in a biennial
series. The sample was drawn on a systematic
basis from the 2002 Australian Electoral Roll,
with mail out, mail back administration of
questionnaires conducted between 3 August
and 24 December 2003. The sample was strati-
fied so as to be proportional to the population
size of each state, with two versions of the
questionnaire administered to separate sub
samples of approximately similar size. The
survey containing the shares questions has a
sample  size  of  2087.  The  variables  used  in
the analyses are derived from the following
questions:
1. Do you own shares in any company
working on the Australian Stock Exchange
(shares registered in your name or that of
your family company)?
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2. Thinking about the companies in which
you own shares, would you keep or sell
your shares in a company if you found out
it had done the following?
The issues chosen for the ethics questions have
immediate resonance in Australia (and argu-
ably in other countries in the OECD) because
all are topical and most are also issues of long
standing. Indeed, four issues are corporate
versions of concerns that are essentially time-
less: harming the environment, using child
labour, producing military weapons and being
prosecuted for racial discrimination. The fifth
item, “giving large bonuses to executives” is
highly topical in Australia and, at least, the
USA and UK because of widespread publicity
over CEO remuneration over the past several
years in prosperous capitalist nations. The
sixth is a relatively recent but vexed issue that
has attracted major publicity in Europe and
Australia over the past five years, involvement
in genetically modified foods.
Essential background to ethics and share-
holders is a description of the share-owner-
ship phenomenon in Australia and given the
range of demographic variables included in
the AUSSA we are also able to sketch this in
the first section of the paper. In the second part
we consider responses to questions on share-
holding/selling and ethical issues before
drawing conclusions.
 
Share ownership in Australia: the 
phenomenon
 
Share ownership in Australia has been increas-
ing since the early 1990s when only around 14
per cent of people owned shares. As Table 1
indicates, this has grown to almost half of the
adult population owning shares registered in
their name or a company name.
On these numbers Australia can fairly be
termed the share-owning democracy that
Mark Latham, the leader of the opposition in
2004 refers to (see Latham and Botsman, 2001).
This information is consistent with the Aus-
tralian Stock Exchange’s shareholder study of
2004, where it was evident that the percentage
of the population in Australia that owns shares
directly and indirectly was the highest in the
world. Second was Canada, followed by the
USA and the UK (ASX 2000, 2004). The finer
texture of this is evident in the discussion of
demographic factors on share ownership,
summarised in Table 2.
Some gender differences in share ownership
are apparent. In general, men are more likely
than women to own shares, although the dif-
ferences are not large. Notably, 7 per cent of
men own shares in 10 or more companies,
compared to only 3 per cent of women.
Age influences share ownership. The young-
est and oldest age cohorts are least likely to
own shares and those aged between 45 and
64  the  most  likely.  This  is  easily  explained
in terms of the peak earning period in the
Western life-cycle. The percentage of people
owning  shares  in  more  than  one  company
is interesting. In the 25–34 and 35–44 age
groups it is only 17.2 and 25.7 per cent res-
pectively of all people in these categories,
while in the peak share-owning ages of 45–54
and 55–64 the percentage of people owning
more than one share rises to 35.7 per cent and
38.8 per cent. It falls again for older groups
with 65–74 at 34.4 per cent and 75
 
+
 
 at 26.3 per
cent. This is consistent, again, with the peak
earning years providing more disposable in-
come to buy portfolios of shares.
The one share-owner population that is part
of this is a feature of the Australian share-
ownership phenomenon. Many of these inves-
tors would have entered the market through
 
Table 1: Do you own shares in any company work-
ing on the Australian Stock Exchange (shares
registered in your name or that of your family
company)? (%)
 
No, don’t own any shares 53.1
Yes, in 1 company 17.2
Yes, in 2–5 companies 19.1
Yes, in 6–10 companies 5.7
Yes, in more than 10 companies 4.9
N (2022)
 
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, 2003.
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Table 2: Social bases of share ownership (%t)
 
Don’t own
shares
1
company
2–5
companies
6–10
companies
10
 
+
 
companies
Women 56.1 16.8 18.6 5.7 2.9
Men 49.5 17.6 19.9 5.9 7.2
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.11
p 
 
<
 
 0.000
Age groups
18–24 76.4 13.4 7.1 2.4 0.8
25–34 62.5 20.2 13.9 1.4 1.9
35–44 52.3 22.0 19.2 2.6 3.9
45–54 44.9 19.4 22.1 8.0 5.6
55–64 45.8 15.4 23.2 7.8 7.8
65–74 54.7 10.9 19.9 9.0 5.5
75
 
+
 
60.9 12.8 16.2 5.6 4.5
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.12
p 
 
<
 
 0.000
Education level
Degree 40.4 17.5 24.0 9.0 9.2
Diploma 49.3 17.2 22.2 6.4 5.0
Trade qualification 51.3 21.0 20.2 3.8 3.8
Completed Year 12 56.6 19.6 14.2 5.5 4.1
Completed Year 10 56.9 17.2 16.6 6.1 3.2
Year 10 not complete 69.9 12.6 14.0 1.4 2.1
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.11
p 
 
<
 
 0.000
Income groups
$0–20,799 62.5 16.1 16.1 3.7 1.4
$20,800–31,199 56.5 18.1 15.6 6.3 3.5
$31,200–36,399 56.0 15.5 19.5 5.4 3.6
$41,600–51,999 40.9 19.5 23.8 6.1 9.8
$52,000–77,799 39.9 21.5 22.9 7.6 8.1
$77,800
 
+
 
23.4 11.7 34.5 11.7 18.6
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.16
p 
 
<
 
 0.000
Self-assessed class
Middle class 41.8 18.1 23.8 7.6 8.7
Working/none 65.0 16.2 14.0 3.7 1.0
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.27
p 
 
<
 
 0.000
Value orientations
Postmaterialists 54.0 16.1 18.5 6.3 5.0
Mixed 52.9 17.2 19.3 5.7 4.9
Materialists 54.1 17.8 18.8 5.4 3.8
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.02
p 
 
<
 
 0.992
Political ideology
Left 52.2 18.7 17.8 5.7 5.7
Centre 52.4 18.6 19.6 5.1 4.4
Right 43.7 12.3 23.8 10.7 9.4
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.12
p 
 
<
 
 0.000
All 53.0 17.1 19.2 5.8 4.9
 
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, 2003.
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the wave of demutualisations and partial pri-
vatisations of the 1990s and the fact that
Coles/Myer, a big grocery retailer had a share-
holder discount scheme in place for much of
the 1990s. This contributed to an increase in
the number of their shareholders from less
than 100,000 to 565,000 between 1992 and
2000. Telstra, the partially privatised Telco,
had 2,037,000 shareholders in the year 2000,
while the demutualised motoring organisa-
tion from the state of NSW, the NRMA, had
1,666,000 and the AMP, a leading insurance
company, had 1,026,000. Many of these share-
holders are likely to be single share-owners
represented in Table 2 who were prompted to
buy because of the publicity surrounding the
float of these corporations and by the fact that
they “knew about” the new shares. The total
population of Australia in 2003 was just under
20,000,000 (ABS, 2003, 3101.0 Table 6) which
means that approximately 20 per cent of the
population owned Telstra shares and 10 per
cent AMP shares at that time, an extraordinary
penetration of the shareowners market by
these companies.
Share ownership increases in a linear
manner with educational achievement with
approximately 60 per cent of university gradu-
ates owning shares and only around 30 per
cent of those who did not complete the usual
minimum standard education in Australia of
grade 10. The pattern evident in numbers of
companies in which shares are owned is also
interesting, with 18.2 per cent of degree hold-
ers owning more than six shares and only 3.5
per cent in the category of non-completions of
grade 10.
A similar (and no doubt related) positive
linear effect is also evident with income with
a steady increase in ownership as income
increases evident. In the $52,000–77,799 group
around 60 per cent owned shares, and at
incomes above this 77 per cent owned shares.
These income levels are not unusual given that
Australian average annual income for full-
time workers in 2003 was $51,298 (ABS, 2003,
31101). Again, the assertion of a share-owning
democracy is supported. In higher income
groups the proportions of people owning
shares in more than six different companies is
very high, with 65 per cent of those with
incomes of $77,800
 
+
 
 in this category and only
11.7 per cent owning shares in only one com-
pany. From this we can surmise that higher
income Australians have a focus on sharehold-
ing. For the $52,000–77,799 category the per-
centages are lower but still considerable, with
38.6 per cent owning shares in more than one
company.
 
3
 
Share ownership is also influenced by social
class location, with middle-class people much
more likely to own shares than the working
class, particularly so among those who own
shares in 10 or more companies. Given that
class was self-selected in the AuSSA survey,
there is something of a circle evident here:
class selected is likely to be heavily influenced
by the fact of share ownership. Also unsurpris-
ingly, political ideology is related to owner-
ship, with those who identify with the “right”
of politics more likely than the “left” or cen-
trists to own shares.
 
4
 
We also seek to assess the impact of value
orientations on share ownership. Inglehart
(1977, 1997) claims that postmaterialists are
more likely than materialists to be concerned
over quality of life issues, such as the environ-
ment, social justice and human rights, as
opposed to materialist economic issues.
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 How-
ever, the value orientations scale is the only
independent variable in these analyses that
does not show a statistically significant re-
lationship with share ownership. In fact, post-
materialists are just as likely as materialists to
own shares.
We now consider share ownership in the
multivariate case, predicting ownership ver-
sus non-ownership on the basis of the values
of our independent variables and a dichoto-
mous share ownership dependent variable.
The results presented are odds ratios from a
binary logistic regression analysis (Table 3).
As the resulting dependent variables com-
prise a series of dichotomous (i.e. own or don’t
own shares; sell or keep shares) answers, logis-
tic regression was employed as an appropriate
method of analysis (see Long, 1997). Odds
ratios are presented in the regression tables.
Odds ratios calculated from the logits (i.e. the
exponential of the logit is interpretable as an
odds ratio) facilitate the interpretation of the
logistic regression estimates. In the multiple
logistic regression results presented in Table 3,
odds ratios for scale variables represent the
difference between the extreme values on each
scale. Odds ratios for dummy variables con-
trast each dummy variable with its respective
reference category. For example, in Table 3,
those with a degree are 1.3 times as likely at
the non-tertiary educated to own shares rather
than not own shares, after controlling for the
influence of other independent variables in
the regression model. Negative estimates are
expressed as odds ratios less than unity. For
example, the odds ratio of 0.6 for the $52,000–
77,790 income category suggests that this cat-
egory is 1.7 times less likely (i.e. 1/0.6 
 
=
 
 1.67)
than the highest income reference category to
own shares.
In the multivariate model, gender is no
longer a significant predictor of ownership.
However, the youngest age cohort is substan-
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tially less likely to own shares than the oldest,
and those in the 55–64 years group are about
twice as likely to own shares as the oldest
respondents (i.e. 65
 
+
 
). A fairly linear pattern
emerges for income in the multivariate case,
with ownership decreasing with income. A
weak education effect is apparent. Those with
degrees are approximately 1.3 times as likely
as other education levels to own shares. The
only remaining significant effect is related to
self-assessed social class, with those who iden-
tify as middle class about twice as likely to own
shares as the working class. The r-squared of
0.15 suggests that the model “explains” a
reasonable amount of the variation in share
ownership given that these are social survey
data.
 
Ethical thinking and share 
ownership
 
The results presented in the first three tables
sketch a profile of the social and ideological
bases of share ownership. We now turn to the
six hypothetical scenarios that may lead inves-
tors to sell (Tables 4, 5 and 6). Table 4 presents
a summary of responses to the six ethical ques-
tions measuring intent to keep or sell shares.
Basic conclusions for this level of analysis
are mixed. Several issues attracted a strong
“sell” orientation, arguably the best indication
of a strongly ethical stance in share ownership.
For example, the 61 per cent of Australians
who suggest that “Using child labour” would
cause them to sell is an unambiguous indicator
of ethical intentions, although several of the
other questions also received relatively strong
support for selling shares. On these figures
shareholders, generally speaking, appear to
operate as (impliedly) ethical beings rather
than just profit-oriented investors.
Adding the “probably sell” numbers into
the mix provides an even more ethically
coloured,  but  complex,  canvas.  For  the
“used child labour” question, 88.2 per cent
would probably or definitely sell. “Caused a
major environmental problem” had 70.9 per
cent either definitely or probably selling;
 
Table 3: Social bases of share ownership (odds
ratios)
 
Own shares
Women 0.9
Men 1
Age groups
18–24 0.4**
25–34 0.6
35–44 1.0
45–54 1.4
55–64 1.7*
65–74 1.4
75
 
+
 
1
Education level
Degree 1.3*
Income groups
$0–20,799 0.3***
$20,800–31,199 0.4***
$31,200–36,399 0.4***
$41,600–51,999 0.6
$52,000–77,799 0.6*
$77,800
 
+
 
1
Self-assessed class
Middle class 2.0***
Value orientations
Postmaterial scale 0.96
Political ideology
Ideology scale 1.04
R-squared 0.15
 
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, 2003.
 
Table 4: Thinking about the companies in which you own shares, would you keep or sell your shares in a
company if you found out it had done the following (%)
 
Definitely
keep
Probably
keep
Probably
sell
Definitely
sell
Caused a major environmental problem 2.9 26.2 42.6 28.3
Used child labour 1.7 10.1 27.4 60.8
Produced military weapons 7.1 34.7 21.1 37.1
Gave large bonuses to its executives 2.6 37.2 31.2 28.9
Invested in genetically modified crops or food 3.3 29.1 37.5 30.0
Been prosecuted for racial discrimination 5.4 46.0 26.9 21.6
 
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, 2003.
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Table 5: Would keep (probably plus definitely) shares in companies who . . . (%)
 
Cause
environmental
problem
Use
child
labour
Produce
military
weapons
Pay large
bonuses to
executives
Produce
GM food
or crops
Racially
discriminate
Women 22.1 8.3 25.3 33.9 27.2 41.3
Men 35.4 15.0 57.1 45.8 37.7 60.7
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.16 0.10 0.32 0.12 0.11 0.19
p
 
<
 
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Age groups (75
 
+
 
)
18–24 37.0 7.1 32.1 57.1 32.1 70.4
25–34 28.2 11.1 38.8 53.7 27.4 47.5
35–44 29.0 15.1 44.2 44.5 31.4 54.1
45–54 24.9 9.7 38.9 39.3 30.3 52.5
55–64 25.1 10.1 37.0 33.3 32.4 43.5
65–74 36.6 16.3 49.5 39.4 44.9 52.0
75
 
+
 
35.1 10.0 51.8 25.4 25.0 60.7
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.12
p
 
≤
 
0.246 0.411 0.181 0.004 0.143 0.078
Degree 24.8 8.9 33.6 49.1 27.6 56.8
Diploma 27.6 11.5 38.6 37.2 34.4 46.6
Trade qualification 35.2 15.6 61.0 38.1 40.0 54.6
Completed Year 12 36.9 13.1 46.8 47.6 33.7 54.4
Completed Year 10 26.8 14.3 39.8 34.1 31.7 50.4
Year 10 not complete 31.6 10.3 44.0 23.4 32.9 41.9
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.10
p
 
≤
 
0.199 0.462 0.000 0.001 0.355 0.175
Income groups
$0–20,799 25.8 10.5 39.6 32.6 31.9 45.9
$20,800–31,199 31.1 11.9 35.9 34.7 27.3 45.1
$31,200–36,399 27.5 10.0 36.6 31.4 26.0 50.5
$41,600–51,999 24.1 13.0 46.1 44.0 31.4 54.2
$52,000–77,799 34.8 11.6 40.4 43.5 39.5 54.0
$77,800
 
+
 
31.7 15.4 57.4 64.0 38.1 72.0
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.17
p
 
≤
 
0.431 0.818 0.019 0.000 0.188 0.001
Middle class 28.1 11.4 41.2 44.7 32.5 54.5
Working/none 31.2 12.5 42.1 32.5 32.2 45.6
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.09
p
 
≤
 
0.357 0.652 0.796 0.001 0.923 0.017
Postmaterialists 17.2 4.9 21.8 34.6 20.6 40.1
Mixed 29.5 12.4 45.0 41.4 34.4 53.0
Materialists 41.8 16.9 50.8 37.0 38.7 57.5
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.06 0.13 0.11
p
 
≤
 
0.000 0.004 0.000 0.258 0.002 0.007
Left 14.6 4.7 18.6 39.0 17.9 37.0
Centre 26.5 11.4 39.9 35.6 27.6 50.5
Right 38.5 14.0 57.1 49.4 48.2 64.8
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.18 0.09 0.26 0.13 0.24 0.19
p
 
<
 
0.000 0.042 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
Own shares
Shares in one company 23.4 11.0 36.8 31.3 24.9 44.0
2–5 companies 32.9 10.8 42.0 36.9 35.8 50.0
6–10 companies 35.6 15.7 42.7 61.5 39.0 59.0
More than 10 companies 27.3 14.9 58.8 58.5 39.8 72.9
Cramer’s V 
 
=
 
 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.13 0.18
p
 
<
 
0.025 0.398 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
All 29.1 11.8 41.8 39.9 32.5 51.5
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, 2003.
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“produced military weapons”, 58.2 per cent
(perhaps an artefact of the Gulf war, but a
disappointing percentage for those opposing
war); “gave large bonuses to executives”, 60.1
(perhaps related to publicity abut CEO pay in
Australia in 2003); “invested in genetically
modified crops or food”, 67.5 per cent (argu-
ably related to publicity about GM foods in
Australia in 2003); and “been prosecuted for
racial discrimination”, 48.5 per cent definitely
or probably sell.
What is interesting here is the strong sup-
port for the long-established ethical area of
child labour but the relatively weak support
for the equally well-established area of racial
discrimination. The importance of these issues
varies within the large group of shareholders
surveyed. Put the other way, 51.4 per cent of
shareholders said they would definitely or
probably 
 
keep
 
 shares if the company had “Been
prosecuted for racial discrimination”. The
statement is unambiguous and anchored in a
definite action (“prosecuted”) making the per-
centage surprising given the significance of
race as an issue in the Western world over the
last 50 years. In contrast, only 11.8 per cent
would definitely or probably keep shares in
companies that used child labour. This issue
remains extremely important to people. The
percentages for keep and sell for the more
recent issues of investment in genetically
modified foods and bonuses for executives
can best be explained as related to recent pub-
licity over these issues – shareowners read
the newspapers and watch TV news and react
to the information provided.
A bivariate analysis of the demographics of
the ethical data extends this discussion. It is
outlined in Table 5.
Gender is related to ethical decision making
in a statistically significant manner across all
six of the questions, but most notably for pro-
ducing military weapons. Only 25 per cent of
women would definitely or probably keep
their shares in a company they discovered was
producing military weapons, compared to 57
per cent of men. Age is less clearly related to
selling or keeping shares, and only differenti-
ates on the question relating to paying
bonuses to executives, with younger people
less likely to sell for this reason.
Education level too, is only a useful indi-
cator of selling or keeping shares for two
questions – producing military weapons and
paying large bonuses to executives. Those
with trade qualifications (61 per cent) were
least likely to sell shares if their company pro-
duced military weapons, while tertiary educa-
tion increased the likelihood of selling for this
reason – with only 34 per cent of those with
degrees saying they would keep their shares.
On the other hand, tertiary graduates were
 
least likely
 
 to sell because of large bonus pay-
ments to executives. Perhaps predictably also,
the likelihood of selling because of executive
bonuses tends to decrease as income rises,
with those on the highest incomes least likely
to sell for this reason. Similarly, the propensity
to sell when companies produce military
weapons reduces as income increases, with the
ethical importance of racial discrimination
declining with increases in income. Self-
identified class is not a particularly influential
predictor of ethical behaviour in share owner-
ship, although the middle class are more likely
than the working class to keep their shares in
the face of racial discrimination or large bonus
payments to executives.
With the exception of executive bonuses,
postmaterialists appear to be more ethical
than materialists across the board. This finding
contrasts with actual ownership of shares
(see Table 3) where postmaterialists are as
likely as materialists to actually 
 
own
 
 shares, but
is consistent with postmaterialist concern for
human rights and social justice (Inglehart,
1997, p. 244). Our findings suggest that value
orientations are also an important indicator
of ethical concerns. The left also claims to be
more ethical than the right for all six scenario
questions, which is not unexpected, although
empirical verification is an interesting find-
ing. These  results  suggest  an  alignment  of
the left–right ideological dimension with the
postmaterialist–materialist dimension, with
postmaterialists and the left overlapping on
ethical concerns in a manner consistent with
the political cleavages identified by Ingehart
(1997, p. 248).
Finally, with the exception of the child
labour question, the more companies one
owns shares in, the less likely one is to let
ethics get in the way of a profit-making
opportunity.
The bivariate analyses show several inter-
esting associations between our independent
variables and the “sell scenario” questions. In
the multivariate case (Table 6), gender remains
a significant predictor of all dependent vari-
ables. It is particularly important for disposing
of shares in relation to companies that produce
military weapons – with women more than
three times as likely as men to sell shares
under these circumstances. However, while
they are important predictors on some depen-
dent variables, income, age and education are
less consistent predictors in the multivariate
model. Higher income tends to be associated
with a reluctance to keep shares on the
military weapons, large bonuses and racial
discrimination questions. Education is an
important predictor for the military weapons
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dependent variable only, with the tertiary edu-
cated about twice as likely to sell their shares
for this reason as non-graduates.
Unlike share ownership in general, value
orientations are a significant predictor of all
scenarios, with the exception of paying large
bonuses to executives. Materialists are more
likely than postmaterialists to say they would
keep their shares under five of the six
scenarios here. So while their level of share
ownership is approximately equal, material-
ists, as their name suggests, tend to be much
less ethical than postmaterialists across a
range of measures. Positioning oneself on the
right of the political spectrum is also an impor-
tant predictor in four of the six scenario ques-
tions, with the exception of child labour and
paying large bonuses. In all other cases the
right are less ethical than the left.
Finally, an interesting – though perhaps not
unexpected finding – is that even after control-
ling for a range of other factors, owning shares
in six or more companies significantly
increases the likelihood of retaining shares for
all of these six scenarios.
 
6
 
 Perhaps we can
extrapolate somewhat here (as we are unable
to directly measure this) to suggest that share-
holders with larger portfolios are generally
more resistant to selling regardless of ethical
considerations.
The magnitude of the r-squared statistics
suggest that our model is quite a good predic-
tor of the military weapons (0.25), paying
large bonuses (0.19) and racial discrimination
(0.18) dependent variables, although has con-
siderably less explanatory value for the child
labour variable (0.08). The small percentage of
variation “explained” for the latter question is
consistent with the fact that child labour elicits
the strongest urge to sell shares of all of these
scenario questions (see Table 4).
 
Conclusion
 
Australia can fairly be called a share-owning
democracy because it has the highest propor-
tion of shareowners of any country. This is a
significant issue for any government; it is
reasonable to argue that interest in shares and
the market for shares increases the level of
general interest in economic issues. For corpo-
rations, it means that their direct links with
society are greater because more people are
involved in their activities. This is particularly
so for corporations such as Coles/Myer and
Telstra, where there are many individuals that
must, under the listing laws, be communicated
with through annual reports and other reports.
However, shareowners are not a unitary
mass. There are important demographic vari-
ations in share ownership, which make the job
of corporations in dealing with their share-
holders more complex. This extends beyond
the scope of obvious pressure groups such as
green groups that operate to influence com-
pany policy.
For a start, the higher the income the greater
the likelihood of owning shares, and in par-
ticular of owning more than one, and then six
or more, shares. Also, the young and the post-
retirement age cohorts are less likely to own
shares than the older age cohorts, with the 45–
54 and 54–65 age groups the peak ownership
groups.
Shareowners are also divided in the area of
ethics and share ownership is an area that it is
reasonable to suggest may have significance to
shareholders. If “definitely sell” shares is an
indication of ethical tendencies for unethical
company activity, there is only moderate sup-
port for most of the six hypothetical situations
we used to encompass ethical areas of general
concern. However, adding in the “probably
sell” shows that considerable proportions of
shareholders have ethical concerns that influ-
ence their shareholding. This peaked at 88.8
per cent for concerns about child labour,
although fell to only 48.5 per cent for concerns
about racial discrimination. The differences in
percentage support for scenarios may have
been influenced by publicity current at the
time of the survey more than embedded legiti-
macy of the ethical issues we put forward. It
is also worth emphasising that female share-
owners are more ethically inclined than males
– a simple division in the large field of share-
owners that has important implications for
corporate communication.
For managers, all the ethical cohorts are
nevertheless sizeable and this means that all
the ethical issues we put forward are impor-
tant in policymaking and in particular in gov-
ernance debates that bear on ethical issues.
The mix of shareholders that must be borne in
mind in such debates, then, is not only the
distinction between institutional and small
shareholders, but between different groups of
ethically concerned people within the broad
group of small shareholders. The size of
these groups obviously extends well beyond
the high profile green-shareholder pressure
groups that have emerged in Australia in
recent years and well-established pressure
groups such as the Australian Shareholders
Association.
These observations apply specifically to
Australia, but are also important for other
shareholding nations such as the USA, UK and
Germany. The detail will no doubt be different
between nations and since this paper focuses
on Australia the material in it provides a
 32
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
 
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
Volume 14 Number 1 January 2006
 
reference point for other researchers to com-
pare patterns in ownership in other countries.
 
Notes
 
1. The AuSSA data were obtained from the Aus-
tralian Social Sciences Data Archive, Australian
National University, Canberra.
2. The response categories for the share ownership
questions  were:  1.  No,  don’t  own  any  shares;
2. Yes, in 1 company; 3. Yes, in 2–5 companies;
4. Yes, in 6–10 companies; 5. Yes, in more than
10 companies.
3. The proportions of respondents in the various
income categories are as follows: $0–20,799: 41.6
per cent; $20,800–31,199K: 16.6 per cent; $31,200–
36,399: 12.9 per cent; $41,600–51,999: 8.8 per cent;
$52,000–77,999: 12.3 per cent; and $78,000 plus:
7.8 per cent.
4. Political ideology is measured with the following
question: “In politics, people sometimes refer to
being on the left or on the right. Where would
you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where
0 means the 
 
left
 
 and 10 means the 
 
right
 
?”
(emphasis in original). The original scoring of 0
(left) to 10 (right) is retained for the regression
analyses.
5. Inglehart (e.g. 1977, p. 28) often uses a question
to measure value orientations where respon-
dents are asked to choose their most important
and second most important national goals from
the following list of options: 
1. Maintain order in the nation.
2. Give people more say in important govern-
ment decisions.
3. Protect freedom of speech.
4. Maintain a high rate of economic growth.
Those who choose options 1 and 3, regardless of
the order of their choice, are deemed “material-
ists”. Respondents who choose any combination
of options 2 and 4 are classified as “post-
materialists”. The remainder comprise the con-
ceptually less  interesting  but  largest  category
– “mixed” values. A three-point scale is usually
constructed from these categories in the manner
we employ in these analyses (1 
 
=
 
 materialists; 3
 
=
 
 mixed; 3 
 
=
 
 postmaterialists).
6. A dummy variable was included to represent
those who own shares in 2–5 companies, or those
who own shares in 6 or more companies. These
groups were combined given the low numbers
of respondents in each category.
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